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Abstract
In the face of recent refugee migration, early integration of asylum seekers into the labor market has been proposed
as an important mechanism for easing their economic and social lot in the short as well as in the long term. However,
little is known about the policies that foster or hamper their participation in the labor market, in particular during the
important initial period of their stay in the host country. In order to evaluate whether inclusive labor market policies
increase the labor market participation of asylum seekers, we exploit the variation in asylum policies in Swiss cantons
to which asylum seekers are as good as randomly allocated. During our study period from 2011 to 2014, the
employment rate among asylum seekers varied between 0 and 30.2% across cantons. Our results indicate that labor
market access regulations are responsible for a substantial proportion of these differences, in which an inclusive
regime increases participation by 11 percentage points. The marginal effects are larger for asylum seekers who speak
a language that is linguistically close to the one in their host canton.
Summary: Inclusive labor market access regulations substantially increase the employment chances of asylum
seekers, in particular if the language distance is short.
Keywords: Asylum policy, Asylum seekers, Economic integration, Employment ban, Labor market access regulation
JEL classifications: F22, J61, J15
1 Introduction
Refugee migration is likely to challenge Western democ-
racies for years and to spur discussions about humane as
well as efficient asylum processes (see, e.g., Hatton 2017
or Hangartner and Sarvimäki 2017 for recent analyses).
How asylum seekers make a living features prominently
in this debate (see, e.g., Bansak et al. 2016). It colors the
discourse beyond the treatment of refugees and seems
to affect attitudes towards migrants in general1. This is
because the economic integration of asylum seekers faces
a dilemma. On the one hand, there is the concern that easy
access to the labor market attracts migrants2; on the other,
restrictive policies preventing early economic integration
might lead to high long-term costs for the receiving coun-
tries. In fact, a recent study finds large negative effects of
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a long initial employment ban on long-term labor force
participation (Marbach et al. 2018). In order to assess
any trade-off, it is thus key to understand how regulation
of the asylum process affects the employment of asylum
seekers, i.e., the most fundamental resource for economic
self-sufficiency.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of a more or less open
labor market regulation on the labor force participation
of asylum seekers, i.e., people who have applied for asy-
lum but have not yet received a decision. Our index for
labor market access considers four aspects: (i) the tem-
poral expansion of an initial employment ban, (ii) the
duration of the work permit process, (iii) whether there is
restricted access to some sectors or strict application of
the priority rule for domestic workers, and (iv) whether
there are additional salary deductions for employed asy-
lum seekers. The institutional setting in Switzerland is
well-suited to learning about conditions fostering or ham-
pering the economic integration of asylum seekers. First,
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while there is national asylum legislation on labor market
regulations, social assistance and integration, the Swiss
federal system offers its states (the cantons) substantial
discretion in the implementation of the law. This results in
a significant variation in cantonal practices in labor mar-
ket access regulations, integration measures, and social
assistance, as documented by an in-depth survey under-
taken by the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population
Studies (SFM) (Wichmann et al. 2011). Second, the eval-
uation is not hampered by any self-selection of asylum
seekers into different cantons, because they are as good as
randomly allocated to the cantons and are not allowed to
relocate until the end of their asylum application process3.
Third, the asylum applications are decided at the federal
(and not at the cantonal) level. Finally, it is very unlikely
that asylum seekers look for employment outside the can-
ton they were assigned to, as the probability of finding
a position and getting the approval of the other canton
is very low4. We can therefore compare the Swiss can-
tons as independent, closed economies when it comes to
asylum seekers.
In Switzerland as in most Western countries, asylum
seekers represent a small fraction of the foreign popula-
tion5, but a prominent one in the public debate. During
our study period from 2011 to 2014, the employment
rate among employable asylum seekers varied between 0
and 30.2% across cantons (with a standard deviation of
6.0%). Our results indicate that labor market access reg-
ulations are responsible for a substantial fraction of these
differences. An inclusive regime, on average, increases
participation by 11 percentage points. In contrast, our
results suggest that the activation and education of asy-
lum seekers in integration programs is a substitute to
early employment and related to slightly lower employ-
ment rates. We do not find any evidence that more or
less generous social welfare payments are related to the
take-up of employment. Further, our results indicate that
inclusive labor market access regulations are more ben-
eficial for asylum seekers who speak a language that is
closer to the language in their canton of residence (the
main languages in Switzerland being German, French,
and Italian).
Our findings complement recent work on the eco-
nomics and politics of refugee migration and integration.
In an excellent review, Dustmann et al. (2017) empha-
size the important role of the asylum process for eco-
nomic integration, stating that “clear rules and support
mechanisms are needed early on in the migration his-
tory, together with fast processing times, fast access to
the labour market and active integration programs” (p.
501). Our evidence shows that small policy differences can
play a decisive role in the economic inclusion of asylum
seekers. Relatedly, Couttenier et al. (2016) report results
indicating that more inclusive labor market regulations
mitigate the risk that victimized asylum seekers will com-
mit crimes. The effect of foreign citizens’ language skills
on the labor market integration of refugees has been
studied by Auer (2018). He exploits the random place-
ment of asylum seekers across cantons in Switzerland,
and thus across language regions, as a natural experi-
ment. For asylum seekers registered as jobseekers, Auer
finds positive effects on the probability of being employed
if initial placements include good language matches. In
another study exploiting the Swiss institutional setting,
Hainmueller et al. (2016) show that long-term employ-
ment chances of refugees are substantially reduced when
asylum processes take longer. Further, Marbach et al.
(2018) show that an extension of the employment ban
for Kosovar refugees in Germany reduced their long-term
employment prospects. These latter findings underscore
the importance of labor market access regulations for
asylum seekers.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 describes the institutional setting and provides
an overview of the policy options in the asylum process at
the sub-federal level. The data used in our analysis are pre-
sented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our
empirical analyses. Section 5 closes with some concluding
remarks.
2 Institutional setting
The asylum practices in Switzerland is a shared respon-
sibility of the federal and the cantonal governments. We
first describe the framework of the asylum process at
the federal level and then highlight the variation in its
implementation in the 26 Swiss cantons. The remarks
on the institutional setting prepare for our detailed
description of the data and the corresponding coding in
Section 3.
2.1 Federal asylum process
People who seek asylum in Switzerland are initially
brought to one of the six accommodation and provision-
ing centers run by the State Secretariat for Migration
(SEM)6. The staff in these centers takes the initial deci-
sion on whether an asylum request is to be processed
or dismissed. If an application is dismissed under Art.
31a of the federal asylum law (abbr.: AsylG), the appli-
cant is obliged to leave the country7. If the prerequisites
for processing the asylum application are met, the appli-
cants are granted a residence permit N—asylum seeker—
for the rest of the asylum process. After a maximum of
3 months in the accommodation and provisioning cen-
ters, the asylum seekers are assigned to one of the 26
Swiss cantons. The asylum seekers have no impact on
this allocation process. It is solely determined by an allo-
cation key based on the population size of the cantons
according to Art. 21 of the asylum decree 1 (abbr.: AsylV
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1). In consequence, this leads to an as good as random
allocation8. The asylum seekers usually have no oppor-
tunity to relocate to other cantons until a final decision
about their case is made. A change of cantons could
be authorized by the SEM in cases of grave danger or
family reunion and if both cantons involved give their
consent. The right to family reunification usually only
includes spouses and minor children/siblings (Hofmann
et al. 2014, p. 18). How long the asylum procedure takes
differs widely from case to case9. Importantly, the deci-
sions about the applications are taken at the federal level.
The cantons have no say in the decisions of the SEM10.
If asylum is granted, the applicant receives refugee status
with a right to stay (permit B). If the asylum application is
rejected, the SEM has to examine whether it is possible to
expel the asylum seeker from Switzerland. There might be
humanitarian or technical reasons that prevent an expul-
sion. In such cases, the residence permit F—provisionally
admitted foreigners/refugees (PAFs)—is given. It allows
for temporary stay and subsidiary protection. The name
of the permit might be confusing, since most PAFs
will stay in Switzerland for a long time, if not for life
(Wichmann et al. 2011, p. 84).
2.2 Cantonal asylum practices
There is a distinctly federal structure in the Swiss
asylum system (see, e.g., Belser 2015; Kurt 2017 or
Spörnli et al. 1998). The national law leaves the can-
tons substantial freedom in setting their regulations when
implementing the law with respect to labor market access,
social welfare, and integration. This has led to widely
different asylum practices across cantons. In particular,
the host cantons are responsible for the accommoda-
tion of asylum seekers, for the promotion of integration,
for social welfare (partly financed by the federal govern-
ment), for support in cases of personal hardship, and
for regulation of access to the labor market. In order to
understand any variation in the employment of asylum
seekers, differences in integration measures, social wel-
fare, and labor market access policies are potentially most
important.
Labor market access
Asylum seekers are initially prohibited from participat-
ing in the labor market due to a federal employment ban
of three months starting with the filing of the asylum
application (Art. 43 para. 1 AsylG)11. After the ban is
over, a potential employer has to apply for a work per-
mit from the cantonal immigration authorities prior to
employing an asylum seeker. The differences in cantonal
practices mainly result from the conditions and circum-
stances under which such permits are issued (Wichmann
et al., 2011, p. 89). The differences primarily emerge
along five dimensions: A first dimension relates to the
time asylum seekers are formally excluded from the labor
market. Cantons have the right to extend the federal
ban of 3 months to up to 6 months12. Second, cantonal
authorities can decide to grant work permits exclusively
for certain industries with a shortage of labor (mainly
agriculture, hospitality, construction, and other low-wage
sectors). Nearly half of all cantons use such restrictions
(Wichmann et al., 2011, p. 89). Third, Art. 21 of the Fed-
eral Act on Foreign Nationals (FNA) states that people in
the domestic workforce should be given priority on the
labor market (in German: Inländervorrang). This means
that a foreign person can only be employed if a suit-
able domestic employee cannot be found—a regulation
that also applies to asylum seekers (Hofmann et al., 2014,
p. 16)13. Cantons differ widely in how strictly they imple-
ment this article. According to responses to the survey
of Wichmann et al. (2011), there are cantons in which it
is necessary to prove that an employment position was
posted at the regional employment center but no suitable
domestic candidate could be found prior to being able
to employ an asylum seeker, while other cantons did not
mention such restrictions. An important fourth dimen-
sion refers to the duration of the application process for a
work permit. While it is rather simple to obtain a permit
in some cantons14, it is a rather complicated process in
others (Lindenmeyer et al., 2008, p. 42). Long and compli-
cated application processes are especially unfavorable for
asylum seekers, who are more likely to find work in sec-
tors where a quick start of employment is essential. This
might be of particular relevance in many of the industries
to which the asylum seekers are granted access15. Fifth,
some cantons impose some kind of salary deduction for
employed asylum seekers, in order to cover their health
insurance and/or rent. This deduction is subtracted on top
of a special charge gainfully employed asylum seekers face
under Art. 86 AsylG16.
Basic assistance
Asylum seekers are generally entitled to social wel-
fare (Art. 81 AsylG). The cantons are responsible for
the amount and distribution (Art. 82 AsylG). The social
benefits are between 40 and 60% lower than the social
benefits suggested by the Swiss Conference of Social Wel-
fare (SKOS) for residents (Efionayi-Mäder, 2013, p. 58).
The directive envisages that basic assistance is supplied
in-kind rather than in the form of cash. Most cantons
apply a two-stage process in which asylum seekers first
spend a considerable time in collective housing before
being allocated to an apartment. In many cantons, asy-
lum seekers in the early stage of the asylum process
get pocket money ranging from 1 to 3 Swiss francs a
day. In the second stage, the cash transfer increases to
between 320 and 768 Swiss francs per month, the mean
transfer lying between 400 and 500 Swiss francs (Wich-
mann et al., 2011, p. 86). The cantonal expenses for
the basic assistance of asylum seekers are at least partly
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covered by the federal government17. In the year 2012,
for example, cantons were compensated with 55.91 Swiss
francs per day and asylum seeker, with some adjust-
ments to the costs for rent and health insurance (SODK,
2012, Annex 1, p. 3). An inter-cantonal comparison of
basic assistance to the asylum seekers shows strong het-
erogeneity in its generosity. While some cantons, for
example, offer free tickets for public transport and sup-
port for exceptional expenses, other cantons only cover
basic needs like food, housing, and health insurance
(SODK, 2012, Annex 2)18.
Integration promotion
Since 2008, cantons receive an earmarked lump-sum
transfer (a so-called Integrationspauschale) for every
refugee (accepted asylum applicant) and PAF of 6000
CHF to cover at least part of the costs related to their
integration (Wichmann et al. 2011). In contrast, there
is no specific federal transfer for the integration of asy-
lum seekers. If projects for the latter group are under-
taken, they are financed by the cantons. Some cantons
use some of the lump sums for cross-subsidization or
spend own resources, while others refrain from addi-
tional expenditures. Wichmann et al. (2011) report that,
according to self-statements, 11 cantons dedicate their
own resources to the promotion of the integration
of asylum seekers. Integration measures, for example,
involve basic and advanced language courses, courses
for general education, occupation programs, and specific
integration measures to promote employment-relevant
skills, such as (paid or unpaid) internships or job
coaches.
3 Data
3.1 Cantonal asylum policies
The main explanatory and control variables on the dif-
ferent aspects of the asylum policies implemented in the
cantons as of 2011 are based on unpublished raw data
provided by the Swiss Forum for Migration and Popula-
tion Studies (SFM). This data is, to our knowledge, the
only available source gathering information about can-
tonal asylum policies in a systematic and comparable
manner. It is based on a survey of representatives of can-
tonal immigration authorities and is extensively discussed
in Wichmann et al. (2011)19. The cantons Nidwalden
and Thurgau did not participate in the survey, leaving us
with data for 24 cantons. While it is a challenge to com-
pare multidimensional policy packages across cantons, we
can rely on indexes based on the expert judgments by
Wichmann et al. (2011). They propose indexes capturing
the openness of a labor market, the generosity of social
assistance, and specific integration policies. The con-
struction of indexes is meaningful as the cantonal policy
choices in the different dimensions are likely to be cor-
related. If single dimensions were considered separately
in a multiple regression analysis, degrees of freedom for
the control variables would be lost and the risk would
increase that specific partial correlations become particu-
larly strong (but misleadingly so). Moreover, the different
dimensions might interact and the independent effect
of one component is thus difficult to identify. An index
enables us to identify the most open and the most restric-
tive regime and allows us to estimate by how much the
employment rate would be increased if the most restric-
tive cantons were to apply the most open policy mix
observed.
The three main measures of cantonal asylum policies
are defined as follows:
• Labor market access is an index quantifying the
openness of the labor market for asylum seekers in a
given canton, ranging from 0 (restricted access) to 1
(most inclusive access). The index captures four
aspects: (i) the temporal expansion of the
employment ban (yes/no), (ii) the duration of the
work permit process, (iii) whether there is restricted
access to some sectors or strict application of the
priority rule for domestic workers (yes/no), and (iv)
whether there are additional salary deductions for
employed asylum seekers (yes/no). For each aspect,
the score is 1 if a canton does not apply an additional
restriction and 0 otherwise. For the duration of the
work permit process, a canton scores a 0 for a
duration exceeding a month, 0.5 for a duration of
between 10 and 30 days, and a 1 for a shorter
duration. The index is calculated as an unweighted
average of the scores in the four categories20. The
labor market is thus considered to be more open, the
higher a canton’s score.
• Basic assistance is an index quantifying the amount
of social welfare and assistance in a canton ranging
from 0 (merely basic needs are covered) to 1 (most
generous in supplying social welfare). The measure
captures six aspects: i) the monthly amount of social
welfare a single asylum seeker receives excluding rent
(over 600, between 400 and 599, or 300–399 Swiss
francs), (ii) the monthly amount a married couple
with two minor children would receive excluding rent
(over 1500, between 1250 and 1499, or 1000–1249
Swiss francs), (iii) how the expenses for food, and (iv)
cloths are covered (cash benefits, vouchers, or in
kind), (v) how the canton covers health insurance
expenses (by handing out the money, or by directly
paying for the premium), and (vi) whether the asylum
seekers receive free tickets for public transport (yes,
only after assured necessity, or no)21. For each aspect,
the score of 1 is given if the first (most generous)
policy is applied for the respective aspect, a 0.5 for the
intermediate cases, and 0 for the most restrictive
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policy. A canton could thus score a maximum of 6
points. The index is calculated dividing the number
of points of a canton by the maximum score possible.
• Integration is an index quantifying the integration
efforts of cantons. It ranges from 0 (the canton does
not offer any integration measures for asylum
seekers) to 1 (comparatively large number of
integration projects). This index captures three
aspects: (i) what kind of social integration projects are
offered for adult asylum seekers (0 points for none,
0.5 points for basic integration measures, and 1 point
for advanced integration measures)22, (ii) what kind
of professional projects are offered for adult asylum
seekers (0 points for none, 0.5 points for courses
about the Swiss labor law, individual career
counseling or coaching, and 1 point if mentoring
projects, internship programs in the private or public
sector or advanced trainings on the job are offered),
and (iii) whether the canton dedicates own resources
to the promotion of the integration of asylum seekers
(1 point for yes, 0 points for no). A canton could thus
score a maximum of 3 points. For the corresponding
index, the number of points are again divided by the
maximum score possible23.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Disagregated by country of origin:
Employment rate 4014 4.935 15.079 0 100
Employment rate [2011 only] 1028 5.589 15.848 0 100
Employment rate [in 2011; excluding cantons 1018 5.644 15.916 0 100
applying an employment ban]
Aggregated by canton:
Employment rate 96 7.692 6.026 0 30.2
Independent variables
Labor market access 24 0.65 0.252 0.167 1
- High labor market access 6 0.979 0.051 0.875 1
- Medium labor market access 14 0.616 0.125 0.5 0.75
- Low labor market access 4 0.276 0.089 0.167 0.375
Integration 24 0.507 0.362 0 1
Basic assistance 24 0.554 0.117 0.42 0.75
Control variables
Population size [in thousands] 96 324.7 334.0 15.7 1,446.4
Population size, ln 96 12.145 1.146 9.662 14.185
Share of foreign residents 96 21.460 7.14 9.82 40.95
Rate of unemployment 96 2.771 1.26 0.9 6.0
GDP per capita [in thousands] 96 76.6 28.0 50.7 167.0
GDP per capita, ln 96 11.197 0.292 10.833 12.026
Yes-share “against illegal immigration” 96 47.23 8.20 30.3 59.3
Fraction of employment in
- Catering and lodging 96 5.524 2.649 2.7 14.6
- Agriculture 96 4.489 2.86 0.04 12.91
- Construction 96 7.883 2.085 4.157 12.038
Fraction of Romance language speakers 96 31.066 36.675 0 94.606
Interaction with language distance
Language distance 3621 0.905 0.084 0.061 1
Note: Descriptive statistics of our estimation sample. If not stated otherwise, the data refers to the sample period 2011 to 2014
Data sources:Wichmann et al. (2011), Melitz and Toubal (2014), Swiss State Secretariat for Migration, and Federal Statistical Office
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the three inde-
pendent variables. Regarding labor market access, one
fourth of the cantons have a rather inclusive regime.
These cantons refrain from imposing any further exten-
sion of the employment ban, do not restrict employment
to specific sectors, apply no additional salary deductions,
and have low administrative hurdles when it comes to
the employment of asylum seekers. Half of the cantons
qualify as applying some form of integration promo-
tion for asylum seekers. None of the cantons in the
sample scores the minimum in the index for basic
assistance.
While the cantonal asylum policies are coded as of 2011
due to the available survey data, we will adopt a longer
sample period—until 2014—in some specifications of our
empirical analysis. Until 2014, the situation regarding asy-
lum migration was rather stable letting us assume that
there were few reforms in cantonal-level asylum policies.
Regarding the large inflow of refugees coming to Europe
in 2015, such an assumption would no longer be sensible
after 2014. There are data restrictions with respect to our
preferred control strategy before 2011, which is why we
are not considering earlier years. We check whether our
results are robust if we restrict the estimation sample to
2011 only.
3.2 Employment rates of asylum seekers
Our dependent variable captures the rate of employment
of asylum seekers, i.e., individuals waiting for the decision
on their asylum application (holding a residence permit
N) who are employable by canton and country of ori-
gin. The rate is measured as of December 31 in the years
2011 to 2014. We thus study the employment situation
for the stock of asylum seekers at a particular point in
time (and not for the inflow of asylum seekers during
a particular time period)24. Figure 1 shows the varia-
tion in the participation rate of asylum seekers in paid
employment across cantons in 2011 (i.e., the year the reg-
ulations are measured). The employment rate was highest
in the canton of Grisons (30.2%) and lowest in the can-
ton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, with no asylum seeker
employed.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the employ-
ment rate, once on the canton-year level, and also dis-
aggregated to the canton-year-nationality level, leaving
us with 4014 observations (= 26 cantons × 4 years
× 10 nationalities). Employment rates vary substan-
tially across nationalities25. Additional file 1: Table S1
lists them for asylum seekers from the largest ori-
gin groups within the stock of asylum seekers hold-
ing permit N in Switzerland. While about 30% of
the asylum seekers from Sri Lanka were employed
in 2011, the corresponding rate for people from
Eritrea was 1%.
3.3 Control variables
We incorporate a range of additional variables in our
multiple regression analyses in order to capture further
determinants of the employment rate of asylum seek-
ers. Moreover, we want to control for factors that might
be correlated with the cantonal policies as well as the
participation of asylum seekers in the labor market. We
concentrate on six factors: First, possible economies of
scale in the economic integration of asylum seekers are
Fig. 1 Employment rates of asylum seekers in 2011. Data source: Swiss State Secretariat for Migration
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captured by the logarithm of the size of the permanent
resident population in a canton. The population size is
the main variable in the allocation key of asylum seekers
and therefore highly correlated with the absolute num-
ber of asylum seekers assigned to a canton. Second, we
expect that it is more difficult for asylum seekers to find
employment in cantons with a tight labor market. We
therefore include the cantonal rate of unemployment as
an additional explanatory variable26. Third, as an addi-
tional measure for the state of the economy in a canton,
we include the logarithm of the GDP per capita. Fourth,
in order to control for more specific demand-side fac-
tors, we take the industrial composition of a canton into
account. We do this by considering the sectors with a rel-
atively high demand for unskilled workers, i.e., catering
and lodging, agriculture, and construction. In particular,
these are the industries to which some cantons restrict
labor market access. We control for the size of these three
sectors measured as the fraction of employment in per-
cent of total employment in the canton. Fifth, we further
control for the cantonal foreigner share in the popula-
tion and a measure for attitudes towards asylum seekers.
Together with the size of the construction, and the lodg-
ing and catering sector, these factors have been identified
as the main determinants of cantonal asylum policies (see,
e.g., Spörnli et al. 1998). Reservations towards asylum
seekers are approximated by the share of yes votes in
the popular vote “against illegal immigration” (in Ger-
man: Volksinitiative ‘gegen die illegale Einwanderung’),
which was held in December 1996 and was seeking for
a more restrictive asylum law in Switzerland. The latter
control factors help us to exclude that any effect we mea-
sure is driven by the fact that cantons in which voters
hold stronger reservations towards asylum seekers have
more restrictive policies and at the same time also employ
fewer asylum seekers. The sixth factor captures the pro-
portion of people in a canton who speak a Romance
language, i.e., French, Italian, or Rhaeto-Romansh. This
variable might capture some unobserved cultural dif-
ferences across cantons in Switzerland. Descriptive
statistics for the control variables are provided in
Table 1.
3.4 Language distance
In order to explore the interaction between access regula-
tion of the labor market and language barriers, we incor-
porate a variable capturing the language distance (which
might well also be correlated with cultural distance).
Language distance is an index meant to capture the
closeness of the main language in the country of origin
of an asylum seeker to the main language spoken in the
host canton. The index takes a value of 0 if the languages
in two places are perfectly congruent and 1 if there is no
congruence at all (i.e., the language distance is maximal).
The source information is the common language index by
Melitz and Toubal (2014)27.
4 Estimationmodel
Our empirical strategy exploits the legal guideline that
asylum seekers are as good as randomly assigned to can-
tons and can therefore not select into cantons depend-
ing on their employment prospects. If this condition
holds, and our control strategy successfully captures most
important confounders potentially driving the employ-
ment rate and the regulation in place, we should be able
to come close to the causal effect an open labor market
regulation has on the employment rate of asylum seekers.
In a first step, we validate the assumption of an as good
as random assignment, and thus no selection with respect
to our explanatory variable of interest. We check whether
the allocation formula fixed by the law, prescribing a pro-
portional assignment of asylum seekers with respect to
the population size, is strictly enforced. Based on the
inflow data of asylum seekers across cantons, Additional
file 1: Figure S1 visualizes that the allocation formula
closely corresponds to the share of asylum seekers that
cantons receive. Thus, the law seems to be enforced. Cout-
tenier et al. (2016, p. 49-50), who exploit the random
allocation of asylum seekers in Switzerland as well, pro-
vide a test to show that the allocation across cantons is
indeed as good as randomwith respect to age, gender, and
past exposure to violence (their main explanatory vari-
able of interest). In a similar vein, we test, in a second
step, for a systematic correlation between the share of
asylum seekers from a particular country received by a
canton and our labor market access measure. We under-
take this test for the 15 largest groups in our sample. The
correlation coefficients are visualized in Additional file
1: Figure S2. As becomes evident from this exercise, we
do not observe any systematic correlation. We conclude
that the assignment of asylum seekers by country of ori-
gin to cantons seems to be orthogonal, at least, to our
main policy variable and should thus not invalidate our
empirical design.
We apply a simple linear model to empirically test
whether a less restricted labor market access indeed leads
to higher labor market participation of asylum seekers,
and whether there are differences resulting from the het-
erogeneity in basic assistance and integration measures28.
For the basic estimates on the cantonal level, we proceed
from the following model:
Yc,t = α + τ1Accessc,2011 + τ2Assistancec,2011
+ τ3Integrationc,2011 + β ′iX + υt + c,t .
Thereby, Yc,t is the employment rate of asylum seekers
in canton c and year t. Access captures the measure for
Slotwinski et al. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics          (2019) 155:17 Page 8 of 15
labor market openness, Assistance that for social benefits,
and Integration that for integration promotion, respec-
tively. As mentioned above, we additionally control for
a set of control variables that might be correlated with
the cantonal employment rate as well as the institu-
tional arrangement. These variables are summarized in
matrix X and comprise the log of the cantonal popu-
lation size, the cantonal unemployment rate, the log of
the cantonal GDP per capita, the employment shares in
the catering and lodging, agriculture and construction
industries, the foreigner share, a measure for attitudes
towards asylum seekers, and the share of the population
speaking a Romance language. In the estimates cover-
ing several years, we further control for a set of time
fixed effects υ. Standard errors are clustered at the level
where we measure our policy variable, i.e., the level of
the canton.
We additionally estimatemodels based on disaggregated
employment rates by country of origin and canton. These
models additionally include country of origin fixed effects
to control for the average level of employment for each
nationality. Please note that the estimated effects for the
institutional variables should remain stable because the
assignment of asylum seekers to cantons is independent of
the country of origin and thus exogenous to the cantonal
policies. However, if there were any remaining selection
driving the empirical findings, this extended specification
should strongly change the estimated effects of our insti-
tutional variables. The disaggregated employment rates
further allow us to explore any interaction effect between
labor market access and language distance.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive evidence
Figure 2 shows preliminary descriptive evidence about the
potential relationship between labor market access regu-
lations for asylum seekers and their employment rate. It
visualizes the development of the employment rate of asy-
lum seekers between 2011 and 2014 in the cantons which
are grouped by the relative openness of their labor mar-
ket towards asylum seekers. The dark gray dashed line
at the top of the graph represents the six cantons with
the most inclusive policies (high openness). These can-
tons do not have any additional restrictions when it comes
to access to the labor market. The group with medium
openness indicated by the dashed dotted line comprises
fourteen cantons that partly restrict access to the labor
market. Finally, the light gray dashed line at the bottom
shows the employment rate for the group of cantons with
low openness29. It is revealed that, on average, the employ-
ment rates are considerably lower in cantons with low
openness. The difference between the group of cantons
with the highest openness and the lowest one amounts
to about 10 percentage points in 2011. The figure also
shows an overall drop in the employment rate for all
groups after 2013. Various factors could be responsible
Fig. 2 Employment rates of asylum seekers across groups of cantons. Notes: This graph visualizes the employment rate of asylum seekers across
cantons which are grouped by the openness of their labor market in 2011. High openness refers to a group of six cantons with a score for access to
the labor market between 0.8125 and 1.00 (the upper quartile).Medium openness includes fourteen cantons with a score between 0.50 and 0.8125
(the two middle quartiles). Low openness refers to four cantons with a score between 0.00 and 0.50 (the lower quartile). The lines show the yearly
average of the employment rate in each group. Data sources:Wichmann et al. (2011) and Swiss State Secretariat for Migration
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for this. One might be a revision of the asylum legisla-
tion in 2013, meant to reduce the duration of the asylum
process. The pool of asylum seekers in later years thus
includes people with a shorter duration of stay in Switzer-
land, who are more likely to face a binding employment
ban and have had less time to seek for work. While
this first descriptive finding is interesting, taking into
account other potential determinants and confounders
can help to evaluate how likely it can be interpreted
causally.
5.2 Average effects of cantonal asylum policies
Table 2 presents the estimation results when the full
range of variation in all three cantonal policy mea-
sures is exploited and when potential confounders are
simultaneously controlled for. In column (1), using data
Table 2 Determinants of the employment rate of asylum seekers
Dependant variable Employment rate [0–100%]
2011–2014 2011–2014 2011–2014 2011 2011*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean dep. variable 7.692 7.692 4.935 5.589 5.644
Labor market access [0–1] 10.658*** 12.268*** 10.623*** 11.203*** 10.705***
(2.144) (2.339) (1.813) (3.633) (3.361)
Basic assistance [0–1] − 3.280 0.090 2.682 4.824
(5.641) (3.263) (4.222) (4.346)
Integration [0–1] − 2.537* − 2.329* − 2.474 − 3.427*
(1.358) (1.302) (1.954) (1.973)
Population size, ln − 2.199*** − 2.112*** − 0.585 − 0.501 − 0.570
(0.651) (0.618) (0.510) (0.958) (0.887)
Share of foreign residents 0.117 0.176 0.029 0.162 0.211
(0.143) (0.154) (0.109) (0.237) (0.218)
Rate of unemployment − 3.042** − 2.336* − 0.038 − 1.475 − 0.062
(1.133) (1.270) (1.236) (1.983) (2.347)
GDP per capita, ln − 7.276** − 7.517*** − 2.649 − 6.329 − 2.855
(2.931) (2.662) (2.742) (4.440) (5.136)
Yes-share “against − 0.181* − 0.182 − 0.150* − 0.131 − 0.019
illegal immigration" (0.098) (0.109) (0.080) (0.114) (0.117)
Fraction of employment in
- Catering and lodging 0.831*** 0.842*** 0.321 0.188 0.367
(0.285) (0.289) (0.231) (0.371) (0.372)
- Agriculture − 1.644*** − 1.448*** − 0.214 − 0.302 0.704
(0.358) (0.402) (0.530) (0.806) (1.137)
- Construction − 0.053 − 0.046 0.230 − 0.006 − 0.231
(0.577) (0.531) (0.517) (0.757) (0.722)
Fraction of Romance − 0.003 − 0.024 − 0.025 0.010 − 0.010
language speakers (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.054) (0.056)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Country-of-origin FE No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 96 96 4014 1028 1018
No. of clusters 24 24 24 24 23
Adj.R2 0.736 0.745 0.181 0.197 0.203
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) use data at the cantonal level, and columns (3) to (5) exploit disaggregated data at the canton-nationality level
*The specification in column (5) excludes cantons stating to apply a total ban. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level and are reported in parentheses
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01
Data sources:Wichmann et al. (2011), Swiss State Secretariat for Migration, and Federal Statistical Office
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on the cantonal level between 2011 and 2014, we find
that the employment rate of asylum seekers in can-
tons with the most liberal labor market access policy
(index score of 1) is, on average, 11 percentage points
higher than in cantons with the most restrictive policy
(index score of 0). While taking potential confounders
into account, this finding is very similar to the differ-
ence observed in the graphical representation. In column
(2), we additionally include the two other policy indi-
cators for basic assistance and integration. They barely
change the coefficient of our main variable of interest.
Basic assistance as such is not systematically related to
asylum seekers’ labor market participation. In contrast,
extended integration programs are related to a 2.6 per-
centage points lower employment rate of asylum seekers.
However, note that the negative effect when in status
N does not necessarily mean that integration measures
have no positive (long-term) effect on the chance of being
employed. Early integration measures initially compete
with paid employment and the impact might be slow to
take effect but long lasting. Hence, the potentially pos-
itive impact would not materialize in the employment
rates of asylum seekers, but rather in those of PAFs and
refugees.
Column (3) presents the resulting estimates using the
disaggregated data on the canton-nationality level (includ-
ing fixed effects for the country of origin). The coeffi-
cient of our main variable of interest is now more pre-
cisely estimated. Moreover, it remains stable. This result
is not surprising given the as good as random assign-
ment of asylum seekers with regard to nationality and
cantonal asylum policies. In column (4), we concen-
trate exclusively on data from 2011, as our policy mea-
sures were only collected in that year, and policies might
have changed later on. The coefficient for labor market
access again barely changes. Finally, to check whether our
results are driven by the fact that one canton reports
not granting labor market access to refugees at all, we
exclude this canton in column (5)30. The effect remains
very similar31.
As mentioned before, our setting does not allow us
to include fixed effects for cantons in order to control
for unobservable cantonal characteristics, as the policy
measures were only collected for 1 year. This might, of
course, pose a challenge to the causal interpretation of the
results presented. If there are unobserved factors corre-
lated with both the employment rate of asylum seekers
and the labor market access granted by the cantons, our
results might be biased. However, we control for those
factors that are most likely to partly determine employ-
ment and asylum practices, i.e., the size of the econ-
omy relying on low-skilled workers, the foreigner share,
the state of the economy, and general attitudes towards
asylum seekers (Spörnli et al. 1998). Importantly, the
partial correlation for our main explanatory variable is
rather similar independently of the inclusion of control
variables32.
In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to bias
from unobservables, we apply the method suggested in
Oster (2017) to our basic specification (1). Under the
assumption that the unobservables are as informative as
the observables (δ = 1), the corrected coefficient of
the labor market access index results to be 7.71 with a
p value of 0.047. According to this approach, the unob-
servables would need to be about twice as informative
to render a treatment effect equal to zero (δ = 1.92).
As we include the control variables that should capture
the most obvious and important confounders, we con-
clude that these results suggest that our evidence is quite
robust.
Overall, we find a sizable positive effect of an open labor
market policy on the employment rate of asylum seek-
ers. We can exclude that our main result is driven by a
self-selection of asylum seekers into cantons, which is the
main concern for the identification of the effect of labor
market access policies.
5.3 Interaction between the effect of labor market access
and language distance
After finding that a more open-access type of regulation
increases asylum seekers’ employment rate, we explore
whether there is heterogeneity in the effect of openness
depending on the language distance between the language
spoken in the country of origin and the one spoken in
the canton the asylum seeker is assigned to. To give an
impression of language distances, for example, a person
from Kongo DR or the Ivory Coast assigned to a French
speaking canton would face a language distance of 0.875,
while somebody from Georgia in a French-speaking can-
ton would be confronted with a language distance of
0.974.
In an extended estimation model, we interact the vari-
able labor market openness with language distance33.
The sample is now restricted to asylum seekers from
those countries for which information about language dis-
tance is available. The estimation results are reported in
Additional file 1: Table S3. The main finding is sum-
marized in Fig. 3. It shows the marginal effects of an
open labor market for different levels of language dis-
tance when the whole range of distance measures in
our sample is considered (based on the coefficients
reported in column (1) of Table S3. While the marginal
effects are overall positive, we observe a clear negative
relationship with increasing language distance, i.e., the
greater the language distance, the lower the positive effect
of labor market openness on asylum seekers’ employ-
ment rate. This seems intuitive, as individuals with a
higher language distance likely face more difficulties to
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Fig. 3Marginal effects of an inclusive labor market access regime for different levels of language distance. Notes: This figure visualizes the marginal
effect of the interaction between the labor market access index and language distance for the whole sample. In order to make the graph readable,
we only visualize it for the top 90% of language distances. The graph for the complete range can be found in Additional file 1: Figure S5. For a
language distance of 0.875 (bottom quartile), the marginal effect of an open labor market amounts to a 11.30 percentage point higher employment
rate. The corresponding figure for a high language distance of 0.974 (top quartile) is 7.04 percentage points. The corresponding estimates are
reported in column (1) of Additional file 1: Table S3
interact and to integrate in a company, further they can
potentially be employed only for a more limited range
of tasks.
We undertake a few robustness checks as language dis-
tance is unequally distributed in our sample. Additional
file 1: Figure S4 shows a histogram for the distribution
of language distances, revealing that only a few observa-
tions are characterized by a very short language distance.
The mass of observations lies at values of 0.7 and above.
To make sure that our finding is not driven by these
potential outliers, we repeat our estimate excluding the
lowest 5 percent and the lowest 10 percent of observations
in terms of language distance. The results are reported
in columns (2) and (3) in Table S3, and the marginal
effects are visualized in Additional file 1: Figure S6 and S7,
respectively. The relationship remains rather stable and
the systematic negative interaction also remains, suggest-
ing that the positive effect of a liberal labor market access
policy is strongest for asylum seekers facing a relatively
short language distance.
6 Conclusion
Many Western countries struggle with the integration of
refugees into the labor market (Fasani et al. 2017). This
is not only a tragedy for the migrants themselves, who
might be living in a precarious economic situation and
miss opportunities for meaningful engagement. It is also
a threat to social cohesion in the host countries, as it
might challenge the support for redistribution. Recent
evidence on employment bans shows that the absence
of economic integration in an early phase of the asy-
lum process can have large negative effects on long-
term labor market participation (Marbach et al. 2018).
In the absence of employment bans, there are potentially
many other factors that affect the economic integration of
asylum seekers. However, there is little quantitative evi-
dence about what determines employment take-up during
the initial phase of stay in the host country and how effec-
tive any regulation of participation is. This is probably
due to the lack of high-quality data and the difficulty of
comparing different asylum policies across jurisdictions.
In our analysis, we focus on the early economic integra-
tion of asylum seekers and provide a macro evaluation of
the experiences in Swiss cantons applying different asy-
lum policies. We thus learn about the effects of asylum
policies from the institutionalized trial and error pro-
cess in the Swiss federal system (Mahnig and Wimmer
2003; Gundelach and Manatschal 2017). We can rely on
detailed information about labor market access regula-
tions, integration measures, and social welfare provisions
for asylum seekers across Swiss cantons. All these poli-
cies are developed to implement the same federal law.
Furthermore, in our setting, a potential self-selection of
employable asylum seekers into regions where employ-
ment is easier can be excluded, as asylum seekers are
exogenously assigned to their canton of residence (and
are normally not allowed to move to a different canton).
We find that during the period between 2011 and 2014,
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with a medium inflow of asylum seekers, cantons offer-
ing the most inclusive access to their labor market are
able to successfully integrate many more asylum seekers
into the local economy, as reflected in a 11 percentage
point higher employment rate compared to cantons with
the most restrictive regime. Integration programs com-
pete in the short run with employment and reduce its rate
among asylum seekers by 2.6 percentage points. We do
not find a systematic effect on participation in the labor
market related to the incentives generated by specific pro-
visions regarding social welfare. The immediate effects of
an inclusive regime are found to be greater for asylum
seekers originating from a country where the main lan-
guage is relatively closer to the one in their host canton.
While language skills are hypothesized to be important for
successful economic integration per se, they seem to work
in a complementary manner to the inclusive labor market
access regulations.
Employment during the asylum process might be
related to systematic long-term consequences for those
asylum seekers who are granted refugee status. Employ-
ment experience seems particularly valuable if asylum
seekers have gone through a lengthy application process.
According to the results in Hainmueller et al. (2016),
the penalty of a 1-year longer process on the probabil-
ity of being employed (a year after getting refugee status
with subsidiary protection) is about 5 percentage points.
They further find that employment during the applica-
tion phase is a strong predictor of later employment.
Employment in the year before the decision increases
the likelihood of employment in the subsequent year
by 48 percentage points. Further, in the German con-
text, Marbach et al. (2018) document that being exposed
to a 7-month longer employment ban during the appli-
cation period reduces the employment probability after
admission by about 20 percentage points. Thus, our
findings are particularly important if the admission of
asylum seekers or their temporary stay is likely (a con-
clusion very similar to that in a recent report of the
OECD 2016).
Our results and considerations lead to several follow-up
questions. First, we would like to better understand the
conditions under which efforts to integrate asylum seek-
ers into the labor market at an early stage of the asylum
process lead to an increase in the inflow of asylum seekers.
This is a pressing issue in the political discourse. Second,
one might ask what motivates the different regulations of
labor market access across cantons. What is the political
economics behind it? And third, there are the interac-
tions with migration policy more generally. In particular,
it would be important to understand how inclusive labor
market access regulations moderate the perception of asy-
lum seekers and attitudes towards immigration. These
issues must be left to future research.
Endnotes
1An analysis in the context of the UK debate on immi-
gration is, for example, provided by Mulvey (2010).
2Despite its prominence in the policy debate (Mayblin
2016), in a recent review of the empirical literature only
limited evidence has been found for this claim however
(James andMayblin 2016). Specifically for the Swiss expe-
rience, Holzer et al. (2000) offer an evaluation of the
asylum policy during the 1980s and 1990s, finding that the
more restrictive recognition practice after the urgent fed-
eral resolution inOctober 1990 reduced applications from
the traditional origin countries but not for people fleeing
from the Balkan conflict.
3 Couttenier et al. (2016, 49-50) provide a formal test to
show that the allocation across cantons is indeed as good
as random with respect to age, gender and past exposure
to violence (their main explanatory variable of interest).
In a similar vein, we test whether there is a statistical rela-
tionship between our labor market access measure and
the allocation of asylum seekers from different countries
of origin in Section 4.
4Wichmann et al. (2011, p. 89) report on emerging ten-
sions between cantons if, for example, an asylum seeker
from the canton of Basel-Stadt wants to start working in
the neighboring canton Basel-Land. Asylum seekers are
subject to the rules in the canton they have been assigned
to which they are not allowed to leave before a decision
on their case has been made. Further, their labor market
participation status is registered in their residence can-
ton. Spatial sorting can therefore be ignored as a possible
driver of our results.
5 Between 2011 and 2016, on average, 27,190 individuals
applied for asylum in Switzerland per year. This amounts
to about 0.33% of the Swiss population of permanent
residents, including roughly 25% foreigners.
6 These centers (Ger.: Eidgenössische Empfangs- und
Verfahrenszentren) are in Basel, Bern, Chiasso, Vallorbe,
Kreuzlingen, and Altstätten. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the Swiss asylum procedure visit https://www.sem.
admin.ch/sem/en/home/asyl/asylverfahren.html
7An asylum application will be dismissed if the request
is clearly unjustified or abusive. This is often the case if the
applicant is able to return to a safe home or third country,
or if asylum was already requested in a safe third country
under the Dublin Procedure.
8 In Section 4, we provide a validation of this assump-
tion in our context (see also Auer 2018 and Couttenier
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et al. 2016, p. 49-50 for a longer discussion on the aspect
of randomness).
9 The main focus of recent revisions of the asylum
legislation was to reduce the waiting period for asylum
seekers. In 2016, the SEM reported that it takes, on aver-
age, 174 days until the official hearing for non-Dublin,
and non-fast-track procedures, takes place (see https://
www.nzz.ch/schweiz/aktuelle-themen/beschleunigte-
asylverfahren-gerechter-guenstiger-schneller-ld.7501).
Note that the SEM decides after further hearings on
whether asylum is granted. Couttenier et al. (2016, p. 45)
mention a period of, on average, about 300 to 400 days
for the completion of credible asylum requests between
2008 and 2010. Hainmueller et al. (2016, p. 2) document
an average waiting time of 664 days (std. dev. 478 days)
in their sample between 1994 and 2004. In extreme
cases, applicants had to wait for several years until a final
decision was reached (Lindenmeyer et al., 2008, p. 53).
10 See https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/asyl/
asylverfahren.html.
11 In principle, the employment ban should account for
the time the authorities need to investigate themainmoti-
vation behind an asylum request. Thus, there should be
no incentive for economic migrants to apply for asylum
(Dustmann et al., 2017, p. 513).
12 In a statement from the Conference of Cantonal
Directors of Social Affairs (SODK) on a revision of the
asylum legislation in 2012, four cantons (AI, JU, UR, ZH)
stated that they might lengthen the time of the ban after
which asylum seekers can obtain a work permit, while one
canton (NW) gave no answer (SODK, 2012, Annex 2).
13 For the future, it is planned to consider PAFs as
domestic employees, see https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/
federal-gazette/2016/8917.pdf.
14 For example, cantons like Vaud offer close guidance
and information on how to effectively apply for the per-
mits (Wichmann et al., 2011, p. 89).
15Wichmann et al., (2011, p. 89) document that it takes
more than 10 days until a permit is granted for asylum
seekers in six cantons. In some of them the waiting period
is even longer than a month (Lindenmeyer et al., 2008,
p. 42).
16 The article states that asylum seekers are obliged to
pay a special charge of up to 10% of their salary to cover
the cost of the asylum procedure, a possible expulsion,
and social assistance.
17 This also applies to PAFs in their first 7 years of stay.
18A detailed list of the benefits payed by cantons to
asylum seekers can be found in Annex 2 of SODK (2012).
19 The SFM promised confidentiality to the cantonal
administrations for sharing information about the de
facto application of the law that is reflected, for exam-
ple, in a shorter or longer approval process when firms
want to employ asylum seekers. For this reason, we are
not allowed to display the values for the individual policy
measures on a cantonal basis.
20 If data for one of the four aspects is missing (which is
the case for the cantons of ZH and BL), we use the average
of the remaining aspects in order not to loose these two
cantons from our sample.
21 In this, we follow Wichmann et al. (2011). The con-
struction that the welfare received by singles and couples
is considered separately in the index gives this aspect
a relatively large weight. However, our results are not
affected if we instead only consider the average score for
the answers to the two questions. The results including
this alternative definition of the index are available upon
request.
22 Basic social integration projects include basic lan-
guage courses, general education courses, courses in civic
education, some kind of daily structure schemes and
payed or unpaid community work. Advanced integration
measures include advanced language courses as well as
the promotion of integration in the first or second job
market. If a canton offers all of the mentioned basic social
integration projects, it receives 1 point as well.
23 This index is capturing whether cantons offer asy-
lum seekers any access to their integration programs. This
is not required by federal law. However, the index does
neither allow us to evaluate the quantity and quality pro-
vided, nor which portion of asylum seekers is able to
benefit from the programs offered. In order to address this
obstacle, an alternative indicator could consider the total
amount spent on integration per asylum seeker. However,
this data is not available separately for asylum seekers with
status N in a comparable way.
24 The data is publicly available and provided by the
SEM. The data for 2011 is available at https://www.
sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/statistik/
asylstatistik/archiv/2011/12.html.
We draw on yearly inflow data in the validation of our
identifying assumption, i.e., the quasi-random assign-
ment of asylum seekers to cantons, in Additional file 1:
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Figure S1 and S2. The use of inflow data is indicted in the
notes of the respective tables and figures.
25 Please note that an employment rate of 100% is possi-
ble and might, for example, occur if a small canton hosts
only one asylum seeker from a particular country of origin
and this asylum seeker is employed.
26 The corresponding data is provided by the State Sec-
retariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in their monthly
publication on the labor market situation (in German: Die
Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt) and includes all registered
unemployed people in a canton.
27 There are, of course, several different ways to capture
the linguistic distance. According to Melitz and Toubal
(2014), it is not sufficient to just include an indicator
for a common official language to capture all the differ-
ent channels through which linguistic proximity might
facilitate, for example, labor market integration. They
argue that besides a common official language, common
spoken languages, common native languages, and the
proximity of two languages are jointly important. They
propose a common language proximity index based on
the common official, and native languages in addition to
the lexical similarity between 200 words of the spoken
languages between two countries. Depending on the lan-
guage spoken by the majority of the population in the
host canton, we define the used language distance proxy
as (1− LanguageProximity), where LanguageProximity is
the common language proximity for the country of ori-
gin to Germany, France or Italy, respectively. Thus, it
captures the distance to the spoken language in the can-
ton of assignment. The used data is freely available for
download at http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/
presentation.asp?id=19.
28Note that the fact that we observe the policy mea-
sures only for 1 year, i.e., 2011, prevents us from including
canton fixed effects in the estimation specification.
29 These groups are defined on the basis of the quartiles
of the labor market access indicator. The high openness
group corresponds to the upper quartile, the medium
group is composed of the second and third quartile, and
the low group is composed of the lowest quartile. The dis-
tribution of the values of the index and the grouping is
visualized in Additional file 1: Figure S3.
30 This information is drawn from section “travail” in
(SODK 2012).
31As becomes evident from our descriptive statistics,
asylum seekers from Sri Lanka are the second largest
group of employable asylum seekers in the sample and
exhibit by far the highest average employment rate of
the top nine origin countries. In order to assess whether
our results might be driven by this particular group, we
rerun all the estimations excluding asylum seekers from
Sri Lanka from the sample. The coefficient for labor mar-
ket access is only slightly smaller and still statistically
significant. Asylum seekers from Sri Lanka are thus not
driving the overall finding. The results of this exercise are
available upon request.
32Additional file 1: Table S2 presents the estimation
results including the covariates one by one. The last col-
umn is equivalent with our main specification presented
in Table 2 column (2). As becomes evident, the inclusion
of the most relevant potential driving forces, or omitted
variables, does barely affect the economic and statisti-
cal significance of the main coefficient of interest for the
index capturing labor market access. This suggests that
it is rather unlikely that other factors, not as obviously
related to asylum policy, might drive the overall effect.
The labor market access regulation seems rather to be
unrelated with potential confounders. This is also holds
for the other asylum policy measures, i.e., basic assis-
tance and integration measures. Their inclusion does not
seem to affect the effect of labormarket access regulations
strongly, suggesting that they do not capture the same
variation. Cantons with an open labor market thus do not
necessarily also have a generous social welfare regime or
extended integration policy measures.
33 Please note that we do not include country of origin
fixed effects in this specification. The language distance
measure does hardly vary by origin country across Swiss
cantons leaving little variation to estimate its effect on
employment.
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